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as requiring an average was unreasonable. If oxygen levels dropped
below minimum for any length of time, there would not be enough
oxygen in the water to sustain fish. Therefore, the BEP correctly interpreted the criterion as a matter of law.
Finally, Warren argued the BEP's re-opener provisions were void.
This argument failed because the court concluded the provisions were
necessary to ensure the state's water quality standards. Further, the
provisions allowed Warren notice and a hearing, as well as an opportunity to appeal. Thus, the court held the BEP correctly included the reopener provisions.
In summary, the Superior Court of Maine affirmed the decisions of
the BEP because the evidence in the record was consistent with their
judgment.
JenniferSu/i
MICHIGAN
City of Brighton v. Township of Hamburg, 677 N.W.2d 349 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004) (affirming that the Michigan National Resources and Environmental Protection Act preempted a township ordinance regulating
permissible wastewater discharge levels into state waterways).
The city of Brighton ("Brighton") applied to the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ") to expand its discharge
permit for its wastewater treatment plant. The township of Hamburg
("Hamburg") filed an objection to Brighton's request with DEQ. The
referee in the administrative hearing held in favor of Brighton. DEQ
then issued Brighton a revised National Pollution Discharge Elimination Permit ("NPDEP"). However, to prevent the expansion of Brighton's wastewater treatment plant, Hamburg subsequently passed an
ordinance that imposed more stringent restrictions on wastewater discharges than the restrictions imposed by NPDEP. Brighton filed suit in
the Livingston Circuit Court, contending Michigan's National Resources and Environmental Protection Act ("NREPA") preempted
Hamburg's ordinance. The trial court granted Brighton's motion for
summary disposition on the grounds that NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance. Hamburg appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. On appeal, the court affirmed the preemption ruling.
To review the trial court's preemption ruling, the court applied the
principles articulated in People v. Llewellyn. Llewellyn established a twopart test for determining whether state law precludes a municipality
from enacting an ordinance. Pursuant to Llewellyn, state law preempts
a local ordinance if: (1) the ordinance is in direct conflict with the
state statutory scheme; or (2) the state statutory scheme occupies the
field of regulation that the municipality seeks to enter, even where
there is no direct conflict between the two regulatory schemes. The
court found the second part of the Llewellyn test applicable, and there-
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fore did not address whether a direct conflict between the ordinance
and the state statutory scheme existed.
The second part of the Llewellyn test consists of four guidelines.
State law preempts local law if the: (a) state law expressly provides that
its regulation is exclusive; (b) legislative history implies preemption;
(c) regulatory scheme is comprehensive and pervasive; or (d) nature of
the regulated subject matter necessitates preemption. The court concluded the first two guidelines did not mandate preemption, because
the NREPA did not contain an express preemption provision and the
inconclusive legislative history of the NREPA regarding whether the
legislature intended the NREPA to preempt local law. However, after
applying the third and fourth guidelines, the court concluded the
NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance.
The court, in addressing the third guideline, concluded the legislature, by passing the NREPA, created a comprehensive and pervasive
state regulatory scheme. Under the NREPA, the DEQ was the sole
agency authorized to establish pollution control standards and to issue
permits for point source discharges into state waters. The DEQ also
possessed exclusive criminal and civil enforcement authority and could
seek injunctive relief for any violations of the NREPA or permits issued
under the NREPA. The court concluded the far-reaching powers
granted to the DEQ indicated that the legislature impliedly intended
the NREPA to preempt local laws regarding the field of wastewater discharge regulation into state waterways.
Regarding the fourth guideline, the court concluded the subject
matter of the regulation, waste discharge into Michigan's interconnected waterways, called for a statewide, uniform system of regulation. Through the NREPA, the legislature gave the DEQ sole authority
for establishing and enforcing standards, and issuing discharge permits
for all state waterways. The legislature, by vesting one agency with the
power to regulate all state waterways, recognized that protection of
state waterways required statewide, consistent, and coherent uniform
policy. The court further noted that a patchwork of inconsistent local
regulations substantially undermines the state's ability to control water
pollution.
Additionally, the court noted that its application of Llewellyn in
other environmental law cases reinforced its conclusion that the
NREPA preempted Hamburg's ordinance. For example, the court
previously held hazardous waste disposal statutes preempted local laws,
because of the comprehensive statutory scheme and the subject matter
necessitated statewide uniformity and consistency. Accordingly, the
court affirmed the trial court's preemption ruling.
CheIyl Miller

